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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Joquin Bello-Catalan, 
Defendant and Appellant 
ORDER 
Appellate Case No. 20040516-CA 
Before Judges Davis, Jackson, and Thorne. 
By reason of the failure of Appellee to file Appellee's 
brief within the time permitted by Utah R. App. P. 26(a), which 
time expired on February 23, 2005, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the 
case will be submitted to the court on Appellant's brief only; 
provided, however, that if Appellee's brief is submitted within 
seven (7) days from the date hereof, such brief will be accepted 
for submission without further order of the court. 
Dated this O day of March, 2005, 
FOR THE COURT: 
•sf. ? 
William A. Thorne, Jr., 'Judge 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
SCOTT D. OAKEY, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 20030751-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's findings and 
conclusion? "When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of evidence, we must 
sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or 
if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 
been made." State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App 106, 1 10, 999 P.2d 1252 (citations 
omitted). Because this case was tried before the trial court without a jury, the issue of 
sufficiency of the evidence is automatically preserved. Id. at \ 9, n.4. 
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2. In the alternative that this issue was not preserved, whether the trial court 
committed plain error in finding Bello-Catalan guilty of child abuse, a class B 
misdemeanor? To establish plain error in the context of an insufficiency claim, "a 
defendant must demonstrate that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of 
the crime charged...." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 71, 117, 10 P.3d 346. An 
unpreserved claim can be addressed on appeal if the "defendant can demonstrate that ... 
'plain error' occurred." Id. at % 11 (citations omitted). 
3. Alternatively, whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a 
directed verdict? When a claim of ineffectiveness is raised for the first time on appeal, 
the issue is resolved as a matter of law. State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973, 975-76 (Utah 
App. 1998) (citation omitted). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All controlling statutory provisions and rules are set forth in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Joaquin Bello-Catalan appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of 
the Fourth District Court after being convicted of child abuse, a class B misdemeanor, 
in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-109(3)(b). 
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P " • • *l*n • D i s p t t M l l 
Joaquin Bello-Catalan was charged by information filed in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court on or about April _ <, 2u02 ^ iLii ciiiid abuse, a class A misdemeanor, in 
the presence of a child, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 
76-5-109.l(2)(c); and assauh -M- p.iestic violence) in the presence of a child, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation oi v iah iwu t Annotated £ , (> ^ , J : a;.o > ^ 
Bench trial was held on May ! 7 2004 (R. 28; R. 41). At trial, the State made a 
motion to amend COUP- I. dhild abuse, to reckless conduct - child abuse, a class B 
misdemeanor (R. ^ # •* -* - -c trial court granted the motion (R 2 ) ) Belle 
Catdiu< - • t .^iu- .
 Il(. , . -4 gi iij;t:)/ tc • : : i ints 2 
a n d 3 ( P r ' , R . 4 , . 4 ^ . 
Bello-Catalan was sentenced to a term of 24 days in jail, credit granted for time 
served, and he was placed on pronation w.\ o mourns >K ) 
()] • , J ii ; i ' ; Ill 5 . 20 0 1 B< ;1 h :> G il .a 1; in filed < 1.1 imel> Notice of Appeal to the Utah 
Court of Appeals from the judgment, sentence, and commitment entered in the above 
case (R. 35). 
ST 4 TFATFNT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Testimony of Christy Sandoval 
Christy Sandoval testified that she lives in a six-plex and Joaquin Bello-Catalan 
his her neighbor and lives on the other side of the building (R. 41: 7-8). On April 23, 
2004, around 9:00 a.m., Bello-Catalan called Sandoval and asked if she would baby-sit 
his children because "he was going to have a couple of beers [and] didn't want the 
children there" (R. 41: 8). Bello-Catalan then brought his two children, Flora and 
Rosa, over to Sandoval's residence (R. 41: 9). Rosa was three or four months old (R. 
41: 10). 
Rosa is the youngest and Sandoval testified that Rosa had no injuries that she 
was aware of (R. 41: 10). Sandoval watched the children until some time past noon (R. 
41: 10). Nothing unusual happened while she watched the children and the children did 
not suffer any accidents while in her home (R. 41: 10). 
At some point while Sandoval was watching the children, she went to Bello-
Catalan's house to get a car seat (R. 41: 11). Sandoval saw Bello-Catalan asleep on the 
couch (R. 41: 11). The house was "a little messy" with some beer cans and a few toys 
on the floor (R. 41: 11-12). 
The State showed Sandoval Exhibit #3, which is a picture of how Bello-Catalan's 
living room appeared after the police arrived (R. 41: 12). The picture showed a little 
guitar that was broken in "many pieces" (R. 41: 12). Sandoval testified that the little 
guitar was broken with the back off when she went over there, but "it wasn't in that 
many pieces" (R. 41: 12, 17). 
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Around 2:00 p.m., Sandoval saw Bello-Catalan's wife driving towards the house 
(R. 41: 13). She got the children ready and began to take them back and then heard 
Bello-Catalan's wife yelling at him (R. 41: 13). Sandoval reached the corner of the 
building, but then decided to go back to her house because of the yelling (R. 41: 14). 
A few minutes later, Bello-Catalan's wife came over and took her children back (R. 41: 
15). Sandoval could tell that she was "frustrated and angry" (R. 41: 15). Sandoval did 
not notice any marks or injuries on Bello-Catalan's wife (R. 41: 15). 
Testimony of Shaun Bell 
Shaun Bell has been employed with the Utah County Sheriffs Office for 13 
years (R. 41: 20). On the afternoon of April 23, 2004, Bell was called to the apartment 
complex where Bello-Catalan lived (R. 41: 21). 
When Bell arrived, he could hear yelling from inside the residence and also a 
child screaming (R. 41: 22). Bell knocked on the door, announced himself as a peace 
officer, and ordered them to open the door (R. 41: 22). Bello-Catalan opened the door 
(R. 41: 22). Bell noticed that Bello-Catalan's eyes were bloodshot and Bell could smell 
alcohol on his breath (R. 41: 22). 
Bell ordered Bello-Catalan in English and Spanish to "come outside," but he did 
not move (R. 41: 22). Bell then grabbed his arm and took him down to the ground and 
placed handcuffs on Bello-Catalan (R. 41: 22). Bell then entered the residence and 
found Bello-Catalan's wife and two children inside (R. 41: 23). One child was several 
months old and the other was three or four years old (R. 41: 23). Bell noticed that 
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"there were things smashed about the residence (R. 41: 23). There was a "broken 
miniature guitar, beer cans scattered about, [and] some baby formula that had been 
spilled" (R. 41: 24). There was also a bottle of liquor that had been thrown down on 
the floor in the bathroom (R. 41: 24). 
Bell photographed the scene and also photographed Bello-Catalan's wife and 
child (R. 41: 24-26). Bell testified that the wife had "a large goose egg on her head 
that was swollen and bruised at the time" (R. 41: 25). Bell also saw that the children 
were crying and that "the youngest baby had a red mark on its face" (R. 41: 26). The 
red mark "was just above the eye and it appeared like it was just a round spot" (R. 41: 
27). Bell admitted that the red spot "didn't show up very well [and] I couldn't get my 
camera to get an actual photograph of it. It didn't show up." (R. 41: 27). Bell was 
unable to get a picture of the child with a red mark on her face (R. 41: 36-37). The 
other child had no marks on her body (R. 41: 27). Bello-Catalan had "a small scratch 
on his arm" (R. 41: 27). 
Bell further testified that the wife's mark "appeared like it was turning dark and 
the swelling was going up. There was no yellowish or any type of color to indicate that 
it had been an older injury." (R. 41: 31). Bell also testified that Bello-Catalan 
maintained that he did nothing to injure his wife or child and that it was his wife that 
assaulted him (R. 41: 33, 36, 38). 
Stipulation of Evidence 
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Both parties stipulated that Officer Marie Provstogaard observed four people in 
the apartment (R. 41: 40). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Joaquin Bello-Catalan asserts that the State failed to present sufficient evidence 
that he inflicted any physical injury upon his child in a reckless manner. The only 
evidence the State presented relative to this charge was Christy Sandoval's testimony 
that the child was not injured when she baby sat her and that a short time later, Officer 
Bell observed a red spot on the child's forehead. Because the evidence was clearly 
insufficient to support the child abuse charge, the trial court committed plain error in 
finding Bello-Catalan guilty of child abuse. 
If this issue was not preserved below, Bello-Catalan asserts the trial court 
committed plain error by finding him guilty, or in the alternative, his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to move for a directed verdict on all the charges. 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse Bello-Catalan's conviction for child 
abuse. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE STATE PRESENTED INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
ESTABLISH THAT BELLO-CATALAN PHYSICALLY INJURED 
HIS CHILD OR ALLOWED ANOTHER PERSON TO INJURE HIS 
CHILD 
Bello-Catalan asserts that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he 
recklessly injured his child in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-109(3)(b). All 
the evidence, taken in a light most favorable to the verdict, is against the clear weight 
of evidence. 
"When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of evidence, we must sustain the 
trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the 
appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
made." State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App 106, 1f 10, 999 P.2d 1252 (citations omitted). 
"However, 'before we can uphold a conviction it must be supported by a quantum of 
evidence concerning each element of the crime as charged from which the [factfinder] 
may base its conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Id. (citation omitted). 
"The burden on a defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is heavy. 
Defendant 'must marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial court's findings of 
fact and then demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings against an attack." Larsen, 2000 UT 
App 106 at f 11 (citation omitted). 
The marshaled evidence that allegedly supports Bello-Catalan's conviction is as 
follows: 
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Christy Sandoval, Bello-Catalan's neighbor, agreed to baby-sit Bello-Catalan's 
two children on the morning of April 23, 2004, so Bello-Catalan could drink (R. 41: 7-
8, 9). When Sandoval began watching them, neither child was injured in any manner 
that she was aware of (R. 41: 10). A few hours later, Sandoval saw Bello-Catalan 
asleep on the couch (R. 41: 11). There were beer cans and toys on the floor, including 
a miniature guitar that had its back broken off (R. 41: 11-12, 17). 
After Sandoval saw Bello-Catalan's wife coming home, she heard his wife 
yelling at him (R. 41: 12-13). Bello-Catalan's wife then came and took the kids and at 
the time, neither the two kids nor the wife had any apparent injuries (R. 41: 15). 
Apparently some time after the police arrived, Sandoval saw the miniature guitar and it 
was broken in many pieces (R. 41: 12). 
The officer that arrived at the scene, Shaun Bell, testified that when he first 
arrived, he heard a male and female arguing in a heated manner and a child crying (R. 
41: 22). He ordered Bello-Catalan out of the house and noticed that he had been 
drinking (R. 41: 22). After handcuffing Bello-Catalan, Bell entered the house and saw 
that it was messy, with beer cans on the floor, spilled baby formula, and a broken 
miniature guitar on the floor (R. 41: 23-24). Bell also saw that Bello-Catalan's wife 
was injured, with a "large goose egg on her head that was swollen and bruised at the 
time" (R. 41: 25). Bell also saw that the children were crying and that "the youngest 
baby had a red mark on its face" (R. 41: 26). The red mark "was just above the eye 
and it appeared like it was just a round spot" (R. 41: 27). 
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Bell took pictures of both the wife and youngest child (R. 41: 24-26). The 
wife's injury showed up on the picture (R. 41: 25). However, the red spot on the child 
"didn't show up very well" (R. 41: 27). For some reason, the "round spot" just above 
the child's eye did not show up on the picture (R. 41: 36-37). 
Bello-Catalan asserts that this evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the 
trial court's findings, is insufficient to support the conviction. After correctly finding 
reasonable doubt pertaining to the charges of commission of domestic violence in the 
presence of a child, and assault (domestic violence) in the presence of a child, the trial 
court found "the child did appear uninjured when she was being baby sat, a very short 
time later she had a red mark on her. She was upset and crying when the officer 
investigated." (R. 41: 49). The trial court then erroneously concluded, "I believe that 
that charge has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt" (R. 41: 49). 
Bello-Catalan asserts that the facts in this case are not disputed. However, the 
trial court's findings are against the clear weight of evidence. Utah Code Annotated § 
76-5-109(3)(b) provides: 
Any person who inflicts upon a child physical injury or, having the care or 
custody of such child, causes or permits another to inflict physical injury upon a 
child is guilty of an offense as follows: (b) if done recklessly, the offense is a 
class B misdemeanor.... 
The only evidence that possibly supports the trial court's findings is the fact that when 
the child was baby sat by Sandoval, she appeared uninjured (R. 41: 10). A short time 
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later, the child had a red mark on her face just above her eye and she was crying (R. 
41: 22,26). 
The State presented absolutely no evidence that Bello-Catalan caused the child's 
red mark on her face or that he permitted another person to inflict the red spot on the 
child. There was no eyewitness testimony that alluded to Bello-Catalan inflicting the 
red spot, nor was there any circumstantial evidence alluding to Bello-Catalan inflicting 
the red spot on his child. The mere fact that Bello-Catalan had been drinking, that his 
wife was yelling at him and that she somehow injured her head, that there were beer 
cans and a broken miniature guitar on the floor, and that the child had a red mark on 
her head and she was crying is not sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Bello-Catalan inflicted the red mark above his child's eye. 
This evidence presents a few possibilities of what might have happened; 
however, there is insufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Bello-Catalan physically injured his child. The most likely scenario is that the child 
bumped her head on something. This would have been a minor accident, since the 
bump left only a "red mark" or a "round spot" that would not even show up on a 
camera picture when Officer Bell took a picture of it (R. 41: 26, 27). This is the most 
likely scenario because the evidence presents no hint or suggestion that Bello-Catalan 
caused the round spot. 
There is simply no evidence to support the trial court's erroneous conclusion. 
Therefore, Bello-Catalan's conviction should be reversed. 
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II. IN THE ALTERNATIVE THAT THIS ISSUE WAS NOT 
PROPERLY PRESERVED, THE TRIAL COURT PLAINLY ERRED 
IN FINDING BELLO-CATALAN GUILTY WHEN THE EVIDENCE 
WAS INSUFFICIENT 
In the instance that this Court finds that the insufficiency issue was not properly 
preserved below, Bello-Catalan asserts that the trial court plainly erred by finding him 
guilty, or alternatively, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a 
directed verdict on all charges. Accordingly, the conviction should be reversed. 
A. The Trial Court Plainly Erred by Finding Bello-Catalan Guilty of 
Child Abuse. 
An unpreserved claim can be addressed on appeal if the "defendant can 
demonstrate that... 'plain error' occurred." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 71, t i l , 10 
P.3d 346 (citations omitted). To establish plain error in the context of an insufficiency 
claim, "a defendant must demonstrate that the evidence was insufficient to support a 
conviction of the crime charged...." Id. \ll. "To demonstrate that the evidence is 
insufficient ..., the one challenging the verdict must marshal the evidence in support of 
the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the 
light most favorable to the verdict." State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, 114, 989 P.2d 
1065 (citation omitted). "[W]e will conclude that the evidence was insufficient when, 
after viewing the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable 
to the ... verdict, the evidence 'is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable 
such that reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable doubt that the defendant 
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committed the crime for which he or she was convicted.'" Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at \ 18 
(quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah 1993)). 
As shown above in Point I, the marshaled evidence, and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the trial court's findings and 
conclusion. Accordingly, the trial court committed plain error in finding Bello-Catalan 
guilty. 
B. Alternatively, Trial Counsel's Failure to Move for a Directed Verdict 
on All Counts Constituted Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. 
The claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to move to dismiss a 
charge for insufficient evidence "succeeds only if the State's evidence was not sufficient 
to support a conviction." State v. Reyes, 2000 UT App 310 (memorandum decision); 
See also State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 114, \ 21, n.2, 61 P.3d 1062; Tillman v. Cook, 
855 P.2d 211, 222 (Utah 1993), cert denied, 510 U.S. 1050, 114 S.Ct. 706, 126 
L.Ed.2d 671 (1994) (rejecting ineffective assistance claim based on failure to move to 
dismiss the evidence to convict was sufficient)). 
In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, it is the defendant's burden 
to show "first, that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable 
manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional 
judgment, and second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." State v. 
Kelley, 2000 UT 41, 125, 1 P.3d 546 (citation omitted). 
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As shown above, the State failed to produce any evidence that Bello-Catalan 
injured his child in any manner. Moreover, the trial court dismissed the last two 
charges for insufficient evidence. Accordingly, trial counsel's performance was 
deficient for failing to move for a directed verdict on all charges. But for this failure, 
Bello-Catalan would not have been convicted of child abuse. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Bello-Catalan asks this Court to reverse his 
conviction for child abuse, a class B misdemeanor. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /J_ day of January, 2005. 
/l^^tnPf/ 
Margaret P. Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 
South, Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, t h i s / S day of 
January, 2005. 
^
: 
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ADDENDA 
76-5-107.5 UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 320 
76-5-107.5. Prohibit ion of "hazing" — Definitions — 
Penalt ies . 
(1) A person is guilty of hazing if that person intentionally, 
knowingly, or recklessly commits an act or causes another to 
commit an act that: 
(a) (i) endangers the mental or physical health or 
safety of another; or 
(ii) involves any brutality of a physical nature such 
as whipping, beating, branding, calisthenics, bruis-
ing, electric shocking, placing of a harmful substance 
on the body, or exposure to the elements; or 
(iii) involves consumption of any food, liquor, drug, 
or other substance or any other physical activity that 
endangers the mental or physical health and safety of 
an individual; or 
(iv) involves any activity that would subject the 
individual to extreme mental stress, such as sleep 
deprivation, extended isolation from social contact, or 
conduct that subjects another to extreme embarrass-
ment, shame, or humiliation; or 
(v) involves cruelty to any animal as provided in 
Section 76-9-301; and 
(b) (i) is for the purpose of initiation, admission into, 
affiliation with, holding office in, or as a condition for 
continued membership in any organization; or 
(ii) if the actor knew that the victim is a member of 
or candidate for membership with a school team or 
school organization to which the actor belongs or did 
belong within the preceding two years. 
(2) It is not a defense to prosecution of hazing that a person 
under 21, against whom the hazing was directed, consented to 
or acquiesced in the hazing activity. 
(3) An actor who hazes another is guilty of a: 
(a) class C misdemeanor if the conduct violates Section 
76-9-301; 
(b) class B misdemeanor if there are no aggravating 
circumstances; 
(c) class A misdemeanor if the act involves the opera-
tion or other use of a motor vehicle; 
(d) third degree felony if the act involves the use of a 
dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601; 
(e) third degree felony if the hazing results in serious 
bodily injury to a person; or 
(f) second degree felony if hazing under Subsection 
(3)(e) involves the use of a dangerous weapon as defined in 
Section 76-1-601. 
(4) A person who in good faith reports or participates in 
reporting of an alleged hazing is not subject to any civil or 
criminal liability regarding the reporting. 
(5) (a) This section does not apply to military training or 
other official military activities. 
(b) Military conduct is governed by Title 39, Chapter 6, 
Utah Code of Military Justice. 
(6) (a) A prosecution under this section does not bar a 
prosecution of the actor for: 
(i) any other offense for which the actor may be 
liable as a party for conduct committed by the person 
hazed; or 
(ii) any offense, caused in the course of the hazing, 
that the actor commits against the person who is 
hazed. 
(b) Under Subsection (6)(a)(i) a person may be sepa-
rately punished, both for the hazing offense and the 
conduct committed by the person hazed. 
(c) Under Subsection (6)(a)(ii) a person may not be 
punished both for hazing and for the other offense, but 
shall be punished for the offense carrying the greater 
maximum penalty. 1997 
76-5-108. Protect ive orders restraining abuse of an-
other — Violation. 
(1) Any person who is the respondent or defendant subject 
to a protective order, child protective order, ex parte protective 
order, or ex parte child protective order issued under Title 30 
Chapter 6, Cohabitant Abuse Act, or Title 78, Chapter 3a' 
Juvenile Court Act of 1996, Title 77, Chapter 36, Cohabitant 
Abuse Procedures Act, or a foreign protective order as de-
scribed in Section 30-6-12, who intentionally or knowingly 
violates tha t order after having been properly served, is guilty 
of a class A misdemeanor, except as a greater penalty may be 
provided in Title 77, Chapter 36, Cohabitant Abuse Proce-
dures Act. 
(2) Violation of an order as described in Subsection (1) is a 
domestic violence offense under Section 77-36-1 and subject to 
increased penalties in accordance with Section 77-36-1.1. 
76-5-109. Child abuse . 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Child" means a human being who is under 18 years 
of age. 
(b) "Child abuse" means any offense described in Sub-
section (2) or (3), or in Section 76-5-109.1. 
(c) "Physical injury" means an injury to or condition of 
a child which impairs the physical condition of the child, 
including: 
(i) a bruise or other contusion of the skin; 
(ii) a minor laceration or abrasion; 
(iii) failure to thrive or malnutrition; or 
(iv) any other condition which imperils the child's 
health or welfare and which is not a serious physical 
injury as defined in Subsection (l)(d). 
(d) "Serious physical injury" means any physical injury 
or set of injuries which seriously impairs the child's 
health, or which involves physical torture or causes seri-
ous emotional harm to the child, or which involves a 
substantial risk of death to the child, including: 
(i) fracture of any bone or bones; 
(ii) intracranial bleeding, swelling or contusion of 
the brain, whether caused by blows, shaking, or 
causing the child's head to impact with an object or 
surface; 
(iii) any burn, including burns inflicted by hot 
water, or those caused by placing a hot object upon 
the skin or body of the child; 
(iv) any injury caused by use of a dangerous 
weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601; 
(v) any combination of two or more physical inju-
ries inflicted by the same person, either at the same 
time or on different occasions; 
(vi) any damage to internal organs of the body; 
(vii) any conduct toward a child which results in 
severe emotional harm, severe developmental delay, 
or retardation, or severe impairment of the chid* 
ability to function; 
(viii) any injury which creates a permanent disflg* 
urement or protracted loss or impairment of tne 
function of a bodily member, limb, or organ; 
(ix) any conduct which causes a child to ceas 
breathing, even if resuscitation is successful fol^v 
ing the conduct; or 
(x) any conduct which results in starvation 
failure to thrive or malnutrition that jeopardizes 
child's life. , 
(2) Any person who inflicts upon a child serious pbysl 
injury or, having the care or custody of such child, causes 
permits another to inflict serious physical injury upon a c 
is guilty of an offense as follows: 
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(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a 
felony of the second degree, 
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a felony of the third 
degree, or 
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a 
class A misdemeanor 
(3) Any person who inflicts upon a child physical injury or, 
having the care or custody of such child, causes or permits 
another to inflict physical injury upon a child is guilty of an 
offense as follows 
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a 
class A misdemeanor, 
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a class B misde-
meanor, or 
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a 
class C misdemeanor 
(4) A parent or legal guardian who provides a child with 
treatment by spiritual means alone through prayer, m lieu of 
medical treatment, in accordance with the tenets and prac-
tices of an established church or religious denomination of 
which the parent or legal guardian is a member or adherent 
shall not, for t ha t reason alone, be deemed to have committed 
an offense under this section 2000 
76-5-109.1. Commiss ion of domest ic v io lence in the 
presence of a chi ld. 
(1) As used m this section 
(a) "Cohabitant" has the same meaning as defined m 
Section 30-6-1 
(b) "Domestic violence" has the same meaning as in 
Section 77-36-1 
(c) "In the presence of a child" means 
(I) in the physical presence of a child, or 
(II) having knowledge that a child is present and 
may see or hear an act of domestic violence 
(2) A person is guilty of child abuse if the person 
(a) commits or attempts to commit criminal homicide, 
as defined m Section 76-5-201, against a cohabitant in the 
presence of a child, or 
(b) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to a co-
habitant or uses a dangerous weapon, as defined in 
Section 76-1-601, or other means or force likely to produce 
death or serious bodily injury against a cohabitant, in the 
presence of a child, or 
(c) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of 
Subsection (2)(a) or (b), commits an act of domestic 
violence in the presence of a child 
(3) (a) A person who violates Subsection (2)(a) or (b) is 
guilty of a third degree felony 
(b) A person who violates Subsection (2)(c) is guilty of a 
class B misdemeanor 
(4) A charge under this section is separate and distinct 
f^rom, and is m addition to, a charge of domestic violence where 
-the victim is the cohabitant Either or both charges may be 
-filed by the prosecutor 2002 
'"•5-110. Abuse or neglect of disabled child. 
(1) As used in this section 
(a) "Abuse" means 
(1) inflicting physical injury, as that term is defined 
in Section 76-5-109, 
(11^  having the care or custody of a disabled child, 
causing or permitting another to inflict physical in-
jury, as t ha t term is defined in Section 76-5-109, or 
(III) unreasonable confinement 
(b) "Caretaker" means 
(I) any parent, legal guardian, or other person 
having under his care and custody a disabled child, or 
(II) any person, corporation, or public institution 
that has assumed by contract or court order the 
re sponsibihty to provide food, shelter, clothing, med-
ical, and other necessities to a disabled child 
(c) 'Disabled child" means any person under 18 years of 
age who is impaired because of mental illness, mental 
deficiency, physical illness or disability, or other cause, to 
the extent that he is unable to care for his own personal 
safety or to provide necessities such as food, shelter, 
clothing, and medical care 
(d) 'Neglect" means failure by a caretaker to provide 
care, r utrition, clothing, shelter, supervision, or medical 
care 
(2) Any caretaker who abuses or neglects a disabled child is 
guilty of a third degree felony 
(3) (a) A parent or legal guardian who provides a child with 
t reatment by spiritual means alone through prayer, m 
lieu of medical treatment, m accordance with the tenets 
and practices of an established church or religious denom-
ination of which the parent or legal guardian is a member 
or adherent shall not, for that reason alone, be considered 
to be lr violation under this section 
(b) I h e exception under Subsection (3)(a) shall not 
preclude a court from ordering medical services from a 
physici an hcensed to engage m the practice of medicine to 
be provided to the child where there is substantial risk of 
ha rm to the child's health or welfare 1997 
76-5-111. Abuse, neglect , or exploitat ion of a vulnera-
ble adult — Penal t ies . 
(1) As used in this section 
(a) "Abandonment" means a knowing or intentional 
action or inaction, including desertion, by a person or 
entity acting as a caretaker for a vulnerable adult tha t 
leaves the vulnerable adult without the means or ability 
to o b t a n necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical or 
other he alth care 
(b) "Abuse" means 
(it attempting to cause harm, intentionally or 
knovvmgly causing harm, or intentionally or know-
ingly placing another in fear of imminent harm, 
(n) causing physical injury by knowing or inten-
tional acts or omissions, 
(m) unreasonable or inappropriate use of physical 
restraint, medication, or isolation that causes or is 
likely to cause harm to a vulnerable adult that is in 
conflict with a physician's orders or used as an 
unauthorized substitute for treatment, unless that 
conduct furthers the health and safety of the adult, or 
(i\) deprivation of life sustaining treatment, ex-
cept 
(A) as provided in Title 75, Chapter 2, Par t 11, 
Personal Choice and Living Will Act, or 
(B) when informed consent, as defined in this 
section, has been obtained 
(c) "Business relationship" means a relationship be-
tween two or more individuals or entities where there 
exists an oral or written agreement for the exchange of 
goods or services 
(d) "Caretaker" means any person, entity, corporation, 
or public institution tha t assumes the responsibility to 
provide a vulnerable adult with care, food, shelter, cloth-
ing, supervision, medical or other health care, or other 
necessities "Caretaker" includes a relative by blood or 
marriage a household member, a person who is employed 
or who provides volunteer work, or a person who contracts 
or is unde r court order to provide care 
(e) "Deception" means 
(1) a misrepresentation or concealment 
(A) of a material fact relating to services ren-
dered, disposition of property, or use of property 
mtended to benefit a vulnerable adult, 
